

An assessment of the impact of toll (gate) fees collection on road maintenance in Zimbabwe: The toll (gates) of Harare Metropolitan Province (2015-2021).

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study An assessment of the impact of toll (gate) Fees collection on road maintenance in Zimbabwe: The of Harare Metropolitan Province. The main objective of the study is to assessment of the impact of toll (gate) fees collection on road maintenance in Zimbabwe. The main research question is the major impact of toll fees collection on the maintenance in Zimbabwe. A descriptive research design was adopted for this study. The sampling technique that was adopted was purposive as it was deemed ideal by the researcher to effectively collect all the necessary data for the study. Data was collected through interviews that were carried with key informants, questionnaires as well as focus group discussion with other stakeholders. The study established that the system being implemented has many loopholes which allow toll officers to misappropriate resources thereby prejudicing the state of much needed resources. The study concluded that there are high levels of corruption within ZINARA starting with the board, management and general employees. The study recommends that need to implement corporate governance practices in the operations of ZINARA to account for every dollar that is paid by the motorists and to ensure that ZINARA accounts for collection and usage of all the moneys that it collects. It was also recommended that ZINARA should work with all the banks so that their systems are integrated in order to ensure that motoring public are not delayed or disadvantaged by system as they travel.

Key Words: Transit, tollgate, toll fees, ZINARA, payment systems

1. Introduction and background of the study

This section introduces the research topic which is **an assessment of the impact of toll (gate) fees collection on road maintenance in Zimbabwe: The toll (gates) of Harare Metropolitan Province (2015-2021)**. This study seeks to understand the role tollgates play in the maintenance of roads in Zimbabwe and also the knowledge gap in the area of study. The Zimbabwe Government

adopted a policy of user-pay principle where road users pay as they use the road. ZINARA Tolling is guided by Statutory Instrument 39 of 2009 which has been amended several times over the past years. At inception in 2009, the Statutory Instrument empowered Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) to collect toll fees on behalf of ZINARA which at the time was incapacitated to undertake such a massive project. This saw ZIMRA employing staff to man tolling points all around the country on major highways. In September 2013 the Statutory Instrument was amended to allow ZINARA to fully take over the collection of Toll fees from ZIMRA which was operating on an agency basis. ZINARA took over the collection of toll fees on the 1st of October 2013 after the amendment of the statutory instrument. ZINARA, working with its partners, developed a Computerized toll collection system and work-flow procedures and documentation. Tollgates play a critical role in the financing highway infrastructure construction and its rehabilitation. Furthermore, tollgates do become policy instruments to avail additional revenue for the Government of Zimbabwe. The ideas of general public through payments of toll fees by motorists was initially mooted around 2000 after concerns were raised regarding the poor condition of Zimbabwe's road infrastructure. Several incomplete road projects around the country further aggravated the situation. Nonetheless, the proposal to introduce road-tolling systems was shelved until 2008. Two reasons advanced for this was that the Government had embarked on its land reform programme which attracted intense opposition from the West, as well as the emerging voice of the country's main political opposition – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:199)

According to Biti (2015:9), Zimbabwe's economy shrank significantly during this period, as Western powers had imposed sanctions to show their opposition to the land reform programme. Subsequently, Zimbabwe faced an increasingly severe economic crisis characterized by rapid hyperinflation and corresponding devaluation of the local currency. During this severe economic downturn, government coffers were depleted, and there was no surplus funds to support road maintenance (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:193).

The period of hyperinflation from 2000 to early 2009 had a debilitating effect on the country's economy (Chitiyo, Vines and Vandome 2016:9). While the Zimbabwean Government tried to still the West and opposition parties' outcries regarding the land reform programme, it also faced the pressing issue of feeding and sustaining its citizens. As such, it focused on providing essential goods and services such as healthcare, while the introduction of the road-tolling project took a backseat. Previously, before targeted sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwean leadership and selected companies, road maintenance and infrastructure development depended on budgetary allocations and donor support by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others (Chilunjika 2013:190). Due to their opposition to the land reform programme, donors pulled out from investing in Zimbabwe's Road infrastructure in the early 2000s. During this time, government needed to step up to the plate as the country's road infrastructure needed urgent attention. The Government subsequently established the Zimbabwe National Roads Administration Fund (ZINARA), under the Roads Act No.18 of 2001. This parliamentary Act mandated ZINARA to mobilise funds to maintain the country's road network (ZINARA 2017:2; Zhou and Chilunjika 2013:189).

At the end of 2008, the country's Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Transport and Infrastructural Development conducted an audit of ZINARA's operations, such as fuel levies, transit fees, overloading fines and abnormal load fees. When it was discovered that these sources of revenue were far insufficient, the Zimbabwean Government mandated ZINARA to bankroll the road-tolling project. Given the urgency of the project and ZINARA's capacity constraints, it had to engage the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) to administer and collect the toll revenue for the highway network investment (Zhou 2012:89).

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013:188), road tolling has obviously become a viable, permanent new revenue source, as government revenue previously supported the construction and maintenance of roads. However, Dr Obert Mpfu, former Zimbabwean Minister of Transport observed that the road access and tolling fees could help supplement public funding for road infrastructure maintenance and construction without straining the national fiscus (Chideme 2013:1).

While toll fees helped alleviate the burden of road maintenance and construction, revenue needs to be managed and monitored more efficiently to ensure transparency. In light of this and other related operational hiccups, it can be argued that road tolling is not insulated from politics. Although people do not usually notice it, our daily lives are interwoven with better road network which facilitates movements of goods and passengers and also trade decisions that can have widespread ramifications (Uwizeyimana 2011:95).

The Government, through ZINARA and the Ministry of Transport, is a key player in the Zimbabwean tolling discourse. As a Zimbabwean parastatal, ZINARA falls under the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Infrastructure Development. It was established in terms of the Roads Act of 2001 to enhance road network systems throughout Zimbabwe. ZINARA is responsible for the management, maintenance and development of Zimbabwe's road network (Chilunjika 2018). In light of this, ZINARA's vision and mission, as enshrined by the African Road Maintenance Fund Association (ARMFA) Focal Group Report (2011:1), is to become a world-class roads authority.

Key performance indicators include providing secure, stable and adequate reservoir of funds. Also, it is responsible for funding the maintenance of the national road network by fixing, collecting, disbursing and monitoring funds usage to preserve and enhance sustainable development. In addition, ZINARA is responsible for collecting, managing, administering and disbursing revenue that is used for the construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's highway infrastructure. Within this regard, ZINARA receives funds from the motoring public who pay toll fees at the respective tolling points dotted through the country.(Chideme,2013)

According to Chilunjika (2018:254), a general trend of shrinking budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development saw highway infrastructure falling into disarray. This backlog in the maintenance and construction of the road infrastructure necessitated Government to adopt a revenue-generating instrument to fund road infrastructure without straining the national fiscus. Toll gates were introduced in 2009, and there are currently 36 tolling points situated between 15 to 20 kilometers from major cities and towns across Zimbabwe (out of the 36 tolling points, five are yet to be opened).

ZINARA currently collects toll revenue from the 31 tolling points, and the motoring public pay their toll fees at the toll gantries. Upon the completion of transaction, the boom gates open and motorists are given free passage. Motorist who paid toll fees gain passage are allowed passage through the tolling points. Drivers are then issued with a receipt to serve as proof of payment.(Chitiyo, Vine and Vandome 2016)

The tolling points are installed with the state-of-the-art technology to process transactions. The Zimbabwean automated tolling systems also incorporate four major components, namely automated vehicle identification (AVI), automated vehicle classification (AVC), customer service or transaction processing and violation enforcement (VE) (Vats, Vaish and Kumara 2014: 444). These features help ensure that the toll facilities identify and record vehicles accurately and precisely as they pass through the toll collection points. In light of this, it can be argued that ZINARA is responsible for providing motorists with state-of-the-art technology that makes it easier for road tolling to take place without any delays and hassles. When road tolls were

established in 2009, structures were rudimentary and toll revenues were collected in the open. In October 2013, ZINARA formed a joint venture with the South African construction company, Group Five. Through Infralink, quality roads were constructed, and state-of-the-art tolling technology was installed across Zimbabwe (Mugabe and Ruwende 2017). In this regard, it can be argued that ZINARA is responsible for creating a hassle-free environment where the motoring public can pay their toll fees without any delays. Automated toll roads enable quick and efficient transactions, which has increased vehicle-processing rates and toll revenue generation. During the manual tolling era, Musarurwa (2015) notes that unscrupulous tolling officers made a significant dent in the finances designated for the country's road fund.

The computerization and automation of road-tolling systems and the widening of toll-collection points were meant to enhance the processing rates of vehicles, thereby eliminating unnecessary queues. However, ZINARA's migration from manual to automated tolling systems, peak-hour queues are still observed at tollgates along significant highways in Zimbabwe. Notably, information and communication technology (ICT) was introduced to bolster the vehicle processing rate and eliminate the pilferage associated with the manual tolling (Duve and Zachary 2015:6).

In addition, the road authorities introduced alternative untolled routes to help shorten queues. Unlike other systems across the globe where alternative untolled routes are provided, it was found that Zimbabwe's tolling system does not make provision for alternative untolled routes. As such, the country's tolling arrangement facilitates maximum toll revenue collection, as all vehicles are subject to toll fees. ZINARA, therefore, generates maximum toll revenues as their tolling model has a 100% charging rate as all the vehicles that pass through the tolling points are charged the required toll fee

2. Brief literature review

In Zimbabwe, the Government adopted a policy of user-pay principle where road users pay as they use the road. ZINARA Tolling is guided by Statutory Instrument 39 of 2009 which has been amended several times over the past years. At inception in 2009, the Statutory Instrument empowered Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) to collect toll fees on behalf of ZINARA which at the time was incapacitated to undertake such a massive project. This saw ZIMRA employing staff to man tolling points all around the country on major highways. In September 2013 the Statutory Instrument was amended to allow ZINARA to fully take over the collection of Toll fees from ZIMRA which was operating on an agency basis. ZINARA took over the collection of toll fees on the 1st of October 2013 after the amendment of the statutory instrument. ZINARA, working with its partners, developed a Computerized toll collection system and work-flow procedures and documentation. The computerised collection system worked to the advantage of ZINARA (Biti 2015).

Tollgates play a crucial role in financing highway infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. Moreover, they have become policy instruments to raise additional revenue for the Government of Zimbabwe. Despite being a more viable long-term option, the mobilisation of domestic revenue was neglected for many years from 1980 till present. The issue of toll roads was first discussed in 2000 after concerns were raised regarding the poor condition of Zimbabwe's Road infrastructure. Several incomplete road projects around the country further aggravated the situation (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013).

Nonetheless, the proposal to introduce road-tolling systems was shelved until 2008. Two reasons for this was because the Government had embarked on its land reform programme which attracted intense opposition from the West and the United States, as well as the emerging voice of the country's main political opposition – the Movement for Democratic

Change (MDC). Biti (2015), strongly argues that Zimbabwean economy shrank significantly during this period, as Western powers had imposed sanctions to show their opposition to the land reform programme.

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013), thereafter, Zimbabwe faced an increasingly severe economic crisis which was characterised by rapid hyperinflation and corresponding devaluation of the local currency. During this severe economic downturn, government coffers were depleted, and there were no surplus funds to support road maintenance. In this regard, Chitiyo, Vines and Vandome (2016), maintain that the period of hyperinflation from 2000 to early 2009 had a debilitating effect on the country's economy. While the Zimbabwean Government tried to still the West and opposition parties' outcries regarding the Land Reform Programme, it also faced the pressing issue of feeding and sustaining its citizens. As such, it focused on providing essential goods and services such as healthcare, while the introduction of the road-tolling project took a backseat.

Legal framework governing operations of roads and tollgates

The National Road Traffic Act Chapter [13:18] of 2000 states that Zimbabwe's Road authorities are responsible for the planning, designing, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation and management of roads that fall within their jurisdiction. Zimbabwe's road authorities are divided into the following four categories: The Department of Roads (DOR) is responsible for all state highways, while Urban Councils (UCs) (municipalities) are charged with maintaining roads that fall under their jurisdiction. In turn, the District Development Fund (DDF) is charged with establishing all-weather road access throughout the rural areas of Zimbabwe and managing activities in Rural District Councils (RDCs) (ZINARA 2012).

The success of a tolling system is premised on the adequacy of toll-collection system, as well as the implementation of funds. In line with this, ZINARA plays a crucial role in road authorities' functioning. It is responsible for the disbursement and allocation of funds to all four categories for the construction, refurbishment and maintenance of the national road network. The revenue allocated to respective road authorities determines the rate of fixing roads. The disbursement and allocation of funds can be based on any one of the following criteria:

- A fundamental percentage split of the total funds available among roads of different classes (which is informed by acquittals).
- A formulation which takes into account the class of the road, its length, width, surface type and the traffic levels on the road.

Identified needs based on the condition of the road network and nature of maintenance work to be carried out (Mbara, Nyarirangwe and Mukwashi 2010).

Methods of payment at toll gates

There are several methods of payments that each motorist can adopt depending on their situation and what they consider as convenient to them. Each motorist has a wide choice of which method they can use to use for their convenience. According to Hau, (1995), smart cards were first introduced in Singapore where they replaced the area licence schemes with passage of time and as several innovative approaches were being adopted or coming into existence.

The other most advanced method of electronic charging or toll collection are smart cards and toll tags. Toll tags were first introduced in 1989 in New Orleans to enable 13 000 uses of a road bridge to pay their toll without having to stop. In this regard, Johansson and Mattson (1995:244) identified the following benefits obtained from the use of electronic charging methods:

- ❖ The reduction in waste of time because there is no stopping at tollbooths and it is a low cost system;
- ❖ They eliminate the need for land and administration costs are low;
- ❖ Electronic charging systems are efficient. However, it does not satisfy the requirements for equity because it favours high-income earners, that is those who value time most.

Furthermore, Hau (1995) identifies the following advantage with regard to the electronic charging system as that the costs of implementing the system are fairly low. The challenge is that enforcement is a weakness in the system because it requires fairly stringent monitoring and enforcement of fee evasion.

The motoring public can pay their tollgates fees through swipe system using any of their bank cards. All then banks and building societies cards are compatible in the ZINARA payment system making it easier to the motoring public. Some of the banks include First Capital Bank, CABS, Esteem Banking, ZB Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and many others.

In addition, the motoring public can upload their monies into ZINARA card which they can swipe at any of the tollgates across the country. It is also highly convenient as the system can even deduct the money later in the event that there is no network when the motorist is passing through a given tollgate in a particular geographic area.

In addition, the motoring public can also put their monies in the Ecocash account which enables them to pay easily by simply registering their vehicle(s). Once registered and they upload the monies, all they need to do is to give their cellphone number to tollgate officers and the system will automatically deduct the moneys and in this time of covid, this is the best way as there is nothing the tollgate attendant or the driver will touch. Thus, there is no worry of sanitizing and washing hands.

The tolling points are installed with the state-of-the-art technology to process transactions. The Zimbabwean automated tolling systems also incorporate four major components, namely Automated Vehicle Identification (AVI), automated vehicle classification (AVC), customer service or transaction processing and violation enforcement. These features help ensure that the toll facilities identify and record vehicles accurately and precisely as they pass through the toll collection points. In light of this, it can be argued that ZINARA is responsible for providing motorists with state-of-the-art technology that makes it easier for road tolling to take place without any delays and hassles.

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013), when road tolls were established in 2009, structures were very basic to say the least and toll revenues were collected in the open. In October 2013, ZINARA formed a joint venture with the South African construction company, Group Five. Through Infralink, quality roads were constructed, and state-of-the-art tolling technology was installed across Zimbabwe. In this regard, it can be

argued that ZINARA is responsible for creating a hassle-free environment where the motoring public can pay their toll fees without any delays. Automated toll roads enable quick and efficient transactions, which has increased vehicle- processing rates and toll revenue generation. During the manual tolling era, notes that unscrupulous tolling officers made a significant dent in the finances designated for the country's road fund. (Musarurwa 2015)

The computerisation and automation of road-tolling systems and the widening of toll-collection points were meant to enhance the processing rates of vehicles, thereby eliminating unnecessary queues. However, ZINARA's migration from manual to automated tolling systems, peak-hour queues are still observed at tollgates along significant highways in Zimbabwe. Notably, information and communication technology (ICT) was introduced to bolster the vehicle processing rate and eliminate the pilferage associated with the manual tolling (Duve and Zachary 2015).

In addition, the road authorities introduced alternative untolled routes to help shorten queues. Unlike other systems across the globe where alternative untolled routes are provided, it was found that Zimbabwe's tolling system does not make provision for alternative untolled routes. As a result, the country's tolling arrangement facilitates maximum toll revenue collection, as all vehicles are subject to toll fees. ZINARA, therefore, generates maximum toll revenues as their tolling model has a 100% charging rate as all the vehicles that pass through the tolling points are charged the required toll fees.

Importance of tollgate in road development and maintenance

Toll gates play very significant role in development in the development of road infrastructure and its maintenance in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in the world. Therefore, from the economic point of view, tolling is an instrument that can be uniquely suited to the collection of efficient road use prices. As a result of this, tolls do affect resource allocation, toll rate levels need to be considered when decisions are made about the appropriateness of a toll scheme. It is argued that tolling (at rates above marginal costs) is equitable--those who benefit should pay--but beneficiaries may not pay in full or at all if they are not users of the toll road.

According to Levinson and Kumar (1993), tolls are mainly imposed for the purpose of raising additional net revenue, and they appear to be a suitable instrument if the object is revenue earmarking or private financing and management of roads. However, investment lumpiness and increasing returns make roads a commercially viable enterprise. It is important to ensure that effects on the economy at large, not only on the toll agency, are included in toll road analysis. There are, however, a number of conditions under which tolling may be appropriate.

BPCC (2000) strongly believes that tolling is a strategy to safeguard the national road infrastructure and to provide a high standard road network. A high standard road network is said to offer the following advantages:

- Promotion of economic activity.
- Enhancement of local and national mobility for the transportation of goods and people.
- Improvement of trade and foreign earnings.
- Promotion and support of infrastructure development.
- Creation of employment opportunities.

- Improved road safety, and
- Reduced vehicle maintenance costs for road users (BPCC, 2000: 4).

In support of the above, Levison and Kumar (1993) strongly subscribe to the following broad socio-economic objectives of toll gates:

- Creating sustainable employment.
- Facilitating the upgrading of the economic and social environment of road infrastructural development.
- Road infrastructure will enable and empower people, communities and business through training, capacity building and opportunities arising from the project.

The very first time the Zimbabwean government indicated it was going to introduce tollgates along the country's major highways, there was scepticism about the efficacy of the programme, but the authorities assured the citizenry that money raised through the tollgate system would be channelled towards the maintenance and construction of roads. However, the fears expressed then, it would appear, have come true, though much to the consternation of the Zimbabwe National Road Authority (ZINARA), which has been taken to task over its distribution pattern per province of the money.

Biti (2009) strongly argues that toll roads assist us in meeting the demands of social services, which are important for the growth of our country. They also make new road capacity available to motorists sooner. Toll roads, therefore, reduce the total net cost to the economy, ensuring greater opportunities for prosperity and growth. Toll roads are built and maintained to the highest possible standards. ... Tolls ensure that funding is available much sooner, for adding highway capacity at the right time thereby relieving congestion, reducing losses in time and productivity.

Chilunjika (2018), is of the strong view that good roads greatly enable and facilitate economic activity, link communities and provide access to vital services. This justifies using public funds to pay for the construction and maintenance of roads. In this regard, road-user charges are in direct proportion to how often people travel. Thus, motorists are obliged to pay an amount that is proportionate to how often the service is used. Vickrey (1968), highly supports the need for setting a toll fee or a road price. The above author highlights that a road becomes "worthless" precisely because it is free. Given this perspective, Focal Group Report (2011) has argued that resources are wasted when road users are not charged for using the road. From an economics perspective, failing to charge road tolls can be seen as policy failure.

Ergas and Greig (2012), argue that a government controls a country's road network. As a result, the governments have the power to levy charges and to determine the pricing of access to parts of the road network. In this vein, Levinson (1998:120) suggest that: "road pricing is a necessary prerequisite to congestion pricing". In this regard, Pigou (1920) predicted that such charges would become necessary to deal with ever-increasing congested roads. Many economists regard road pricing as an instrument to optimise resource usage. Since tolls provide an on-going revenue source that is not tied to the annual government budgetary process, funds can be channelled directly to the construction and maintenance of a particular road. This ensures that maintenance funds do not compete with the requirements of other roads in the network. Governments are legally bound by laws and statutes that provide specific guidelines on how to use toll fees.

The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) (2011) strongly believes that mobilising domestic resources through road tolls has become an important development issue. According to Ergas and Greig (2012), the idea of road tolling is based on the theory that more road capacity attracts sufficient additional road usage to cancel out the congestion-alleviating effect of costly road-capacity increases. Commenting on the economics of tolling, Hau (1991), Levinson and Kumar (1993), Denghai and Olsen (1998), contend that road tolling and pricing has proved to be a welfare-increasing policy. It is believed that, when used in conjunction with network-capacity provision, road tolling and pricing can contribute to the financial sustainability and cost-effectiveness of infrastructure investment. After exploring the economic underpinnings of road tolling or road pricing, it is imperative to capture the political dynamics of road tolling.

The Government, through ZINARA and the Ministry of Transport, is a key player in the Zimbabwean tolling business. As a Zimbabwean parastatal, ZINARA falls under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development. It was established in terms of the Roads Act of 2001 to enhance road network systems throughout Zimbabwe. ZINARA is responsible for the management, maintenance and development of Zimbabwe's Road network (Chilunjika 2018). In light of this, ZINARA's vision and mission, as enshrined by the African Road Maintenance Fund Association (ARMFA) Focal Group Report (2011), is to become a world-class roads authority.

Key performance indicators include providing secure, stable and adequate reservoir of funds. Furthermore, ZINARA is responsible for funding the maintenance of the national road network by fixing, collecting, disbursing and monitoring funds usage to preserve and enhance sustainable development. In addition, ZINARA is responsible for collecting, managing, administering and disbursing revenue that is used for the construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of Zimbabwe's highway infrastructure. Within this regard, ZINARA receives funds from the motoring public who pay toll fees at the respective tolling points dotted through the country.

According to Chilunjika (2018), a general trend of shrinking budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development sees highway infrastructure falling into disarray. This backlog in the maintenance and construction of the road infrastructure necessitated Government to adopt a revenue-generating instrument to fund road infrastructure without straining the national fiscus. Toll gates were introduced in 2009, and there are currently 36 tolling points situated between 15 to 20 kilometres from major cities and towns across Zimbabwe (out of the 36 tolling points, five are yet to be opened). ZINARA currently collects toll revenue from the 31 tolling points, and the motoring public pay their toll fees at the toll gantries. Upon the completion of transaction, the boom gates open and motorists are given free passage. Motorist who paid toll fees gain passage are allowed passage through the tolling points. (Matabvu 2018).

Challenges faced by generality of the motoring public

The operating cost of trucks varies greatly within the Southern Africa just as it is based on fuel taxes, wages, and tolls. Tolls increase the operational cost of trucks. This increase in cost has been assumed to impact the efficiency of how trucks are loaded as pricing pressure decreases the likelihood of empty headings or suboptimal truck loads. Currently, 20% of trucks are empty on European

roads while average utility of loaded vehicles is as low as 58% in some countries.

It is assumed that haulage companies look to operate at maximum capacity if the price of transport is at such a level that truck drivers cannot afford inefficient operations. Certain empty headings are unavoidable but a higher cost of transport can incentivise the use of internet applications or creative logistic practices that increase awareness of freight volumes in close proximity to an empty truck. There is huge potential for new technologies for fleet and consignment management, as well as new trends coming from the shared economy. Tolls are a means to increase the rate at which such technologies are used. The benefits of such improved efficiency are shared by both the freight market and the shipper, as well as reducing congestion and other externalities from road transport.

According to Juma (2015:10), when toll roads were first introduced in 2009, 22 toll points were established on all the regional trunk roads throughout the country. The most basic version of the MTC system was introduced, which consisted of lane markings, demarcated by 705mm plastic cones, a resting tent and a makeshift office and toll collectors who collected fees from motorists. During the early stage, no toll booths were constructed at the toll sites., toll fees were collected in the open at gazetted tolling points. This was hazardous to collectors, as they ran the risk of being run over by motorists who wanted to evade payment. The labour-based the collection process also led to fatigue-related challenges.

According to Zhou and Chilunjika (2013), Zimbabwe's fledgling tolling system faced the following challenges:

- ❖ Issuing change was problem, especially during changes in shifts. As a result, vehicles parked next to the booths while waiting for change.
- ❖ Revenue was lost during heavy rainstorms. As rudimentary structures did not provide adequate shelter against the weather, toll officials abandoned the toll gates leaving vehicles to pass through without paying. For example, The toll gate after Gwanda, and Hwange tollgate
- ❖ As there were no proper monitoring systems, the vehicle type that passed through the toll booth could not be determined — this created irregularities between the collected fees and the vehicle types. In some cases the criminal elements of ZINARA officers could falsify the charges, for instance, they could take money paid by trucks and submit falsified returns thereby stealing a lot of moneys from ZINARA.

According to Juma (2015), before the computerisation of Zimbabwe's tolling system, the enforcement of collection fees was inefficient. Moreover, it was characterised by fraudulent activity (ZINARA 2014:10) There were many loopholes, which led to regular pilferage and severe revenue losses. For example, motorists could pass tolling points without paying, or toll collectors could use one receipt for two vehicles (Zhou and Chilunjika 2013; ZINARA 2014:10). This lack of control made it difficult to ascertain the actual vehicle population. Moreover, no reporting structures were in place, which was exacerbated by limited and difficult auditing and poor working conditions. Since it was challenging to compile and reconcile data, it was almost impossible to audit the manual system.

When ZINARA was mandated to collect fees independently, it designed new workflow procedures and documentation that streamlined the process. Toll plazas were constructed

and computerized, and some electronic features were implemented. High-tech additions like smart power solutions, automatic number-plate recognition (ANPR) technology, CCTV with live-streaming and radio-frequency identification (RFID) were adopted and operationalised. The introduction of automated tolling systems improved general cash collection, vehicle and transaction control, auditing and enforcement. Now toll collectors work in well-built, air-conditioned cubicles, while computer-generated tickets are issued to motorists who have paid their toll fees. (ZINARA 2014)

In addition, the introduction of automated toll collection has enhanced transparency and accountability. To curb fraudulent activity, ZINARA has fiscalised transactions at tolling points. As all transactions can now be tracked, pilferage and revenue leakages are minimized. According to Chilunjika (2018), the tolls had to reconcile collected fees with the recorded number of vehicles before leaving their shifts and because those who worked for the system realized that there were ways to beat the system so it became a major challenge to be dealt.

Furthermore, Zhou and Chilunjika (2013), argue that the original arrangement was that toll collectors made their collections without close supervision. They were only accountable to ZIMRA accountants. However, these accountants doubled as toll managers and hardly visited the tolling points. This created a major problem for the smooth operation of the system. Accordingly, toll managers relied heavily on collectors' collection figures. Given such an arrangement, the toll collectors had more room to embezzle toll fees. In a bid to curb toll revenue leakages, armed Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officers were called in to curb corruption and fraudulent activities among toll collectors. At the end of toll collectors' shifts, police officers do physical checks to ensure that everything is in order. The toll collectors are also required to declare any money that they bring to the toll station. Also, they are required to leave all their belongings (mobile phones, wallets and money) in their lockers. Members of the ZRP also protect tollbooths from armed robbers and potential toll evaders.

Another major challenge to the road users is that despite the low traffic volumes, the government is determined to generate as much revenue from the toll systems as possible. This will be achieved through increasing the number of toll gates across the country. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Transport indicated that the current toll gates are not generating enough revenue. He indicated that there are plans to increase the number of toll gates as a way of boosting government coffers. In expressing this view he said, 'at the moment, we are collecting around US\$1.3 million a month from our 22 tolling points throughout the country. We believe if we increase these points, we are going to be able to get more funds to attend to the pressing needs of our country and infrastructure. Our view as a ministry is that these funds are not sufficient enough to cover our needs. We need more funds. We have to specifically generate resources to meet the challenges we face.' (Standard, 1 May 2010).

Factors that promote efficient uses of resources

Nature of board of directors

The Board of Directors of ZINARA is full of controversy from its appointment and operations. There was no proper corporate governance in ZINARA. It was totally mismanaged and as a result there was gross abuse of resources. In particular, ZINARA had no sound human resources policies and unqualified persons were recruited through

nepotism. As a result, incompetent people-controlled budgets running into millions of US dollars, and this led to corruption. For example, between 2011 and March 2016 Board members were paid a total of US \$673 744 in fees and allowances without approval from the parent Ministry. In 2018 each board member received Christmas hampers worth US \$9 600. In 2013 seven senior managers received gym equipment worth US \$4 000 each. All female employees received a hair allowance which cost a total of US \$24 500 from 2011 to 2013. These payments were not processed through ZINARA's payroll, as they should have been.

Coetzee (2019) argues there is extremely weak corporate governance systems in place at ZINARA. As a result, ZINARA's annual wage expenditure was on average eight point five per cent over the limit imposed by section 15(1)(d) of the Roads Act. As a result of weak systems of corporate governance at ZINARA, appointments being done by Human Resources Management is unprofessional and employment is based on nepotism, and political affiliation. For example, the qualification of the Director of Administration and Human Resources consisted of a diploma in biblical studies, and he was appointed to the post without having been interviewed. The Finance Manager was not a qualified accountant.

The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission [ZACC] should investigate abuse of office by all officials of ZINARA whose activities are covered in the report. Disciplinary action and, where appropriate, criminal proceedings should be taken against them. Illegal allowances paid to members of ZINARA's board should be refunded within six months. Within three months ZINARA should seek expert help to develop systems and procedures for proper corporate governance.

Challenges facing in the construction of tollgates

To date, the infrastructure has deteriorated to such an extent that the public is being seriously inconvenienced, while the normal functioning of businesses has been severely affected. There is general consensus among local communities, public and private institutions that the vital national grid has deteriorated beyond any acceptable minimal standard socially, economically and environmentally. There has, thus, been much interest and anxiety in relation to the new road management approach that has been introduced by the government. This strategy is founded on the application of the user-pay principle to accrue funding for maintenance and construction of road infrastructure.

3. Research Methodology

The researchers adopted a case study approach because case studies involve in-depth research and study of individuals or groups or an organisation. The exploratory design does emphasis on studying a problem or situation in order to explain the relationship between variables which in this case is collection of funds and its relationship to road maintenance. Exploratory research is usually conducted to study a problem that has not been clearly defined yet. Therefore, these researchers strongly believe that in order to determine the nature of the problem, exploratory research is helps us to have a better understanding of the problem.

Furthermore, Greener (2008) argues that exploratory research "tends to tackle new problems on which little or no previous research has been done." Unstructured interviews are the most popular primary data collection method with exploratory studies.

Population of Study and Sample

For this study, the target population included the different people and groups that included tollgate operators, police officers manning tollgates, Accounts office in ZINARA, ZIMRA Accounts officers, Ministry of Finance Officers, random selection of motorists such as truck drivers. The researchers targeted the above-mentioned population groups because of their knowledge and frequent use of the tollgates. Tollgate officers and motorists will make the larger number of respondents. The remaining population however plays an important role in the communication and implementation of the regulations and was therefore taken into consideration in the sampling design. A sample of 200 respondents was used for this study. To ensure absence of bias from a single sampling method, purposive sampling was used and the process involved purposely handpicking individuals from the population based on the authority or the researcher's knowledge and judgment. This was also because the study area had a limited number of individuals possessing the trait of interest thus it was a viable sampling technique in obtaining information from a very specific group of people. This technique was mainly used to select a sample from the district council personnel.

The researchers used questionnaires with most stakeholders as well as focus group discussions with drivers especially at the port of entry such as Beitbridge and Plumtree as well as Chirundu. Then interviews were done with key informants who were believed to be more knowledgeable about the matters under discussion. Face to face interviews were conducted to collect data from the ZIMRA, ZINARA head office personnel, noting that these afforded the researcher the opportunity to judge the respondent's comprehension of the issues at hand. The greatest advantage of using face to face interviews was that more information was gathered from the respondents. However, face to face interviews proved to be expensive in terms of time resulting in a limited number of participants being interviewed.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Analysis of data collected was both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative data was analysed using content. According to Webber (1990) content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. Analysis was done by going through observations and questionnaire notes identifying features and coding them to obtain different emerging ideas. This coded information was then arranged, presented and interpreted through graphs and tables. Whilst content analysis was used in qualitative data, descriptive statistical tools including graphs, charts, and tables were employed in the quantitative analysis.

4. Presentation of findings, Analysis and Interpretation

This section presents the output of data analysis.

Response Rate

The response rate was high as the researcher managed to reach eighty-nine percent of the targeted sample. Table 1 shows the response rate which translates to three and a half percent of the total population size.

Table 1: Response Rate

Category	Sample size	Respondents	%
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ZINARA, ZIMRA, Officials	100	87	87
Ministry of Finance, Auditor General's Office	25	20	80
Truck drivers and general motorists	50	41	82
Others	25	23	92
Grand Total	200	171	85.5

Respondents' Background

The background information of respondents was necessary and important because the ability of the respondents to give satisfactory information on the study variables greatly depended on their age, gender and length of stay. The background information of respondents solicited data on the samples and this has been presented below categorized into gender, age and length of their road usage and general travelling.

Forty-five-point eight percent of the targeted respondents were male and fifty-four point two percent were female. This indicates the gender distribution of the road users' population and can be compared to 2012 census data for Harare province which indicates that the province is populated by fifty-one point seven percent females and forty-eight point three percent males. The percentage of women in the study is slightly higher than in census values. A contributing factor could be that the questionnaires and interviews were properly sampled such that the sampling techniques were not biased and it covered a broad spectrum. The findings represent the views of the two gender groups about toll fee collection and its use for road maintenance and the respondents showed much appreciation of the issues under discussion. This was necessary for the study to get a balanced picture of the respondents' views.

Thirty-six percent of the respondents are in the age group of between 26-35, followed by the 36-45 age-group which constituted twenty-nine percent, 18-25 age-group constituted fifteen percent, the 56+ age-group constituted twelve percent and the 46-55 age-group constituted eight percent. It can therefore be concluded that all of the respondents are mature enough to understand the issues with regards to toll fee collection and subsequent use of the funds. Those in the age group 26 to 56 plus were well knowledgeable of the matters under discussion and were able to propose and recommend way forward. It was imperative to include the level of respondent's education standards in this study. This was combined with both methods to understand if it affects the way they affect respondent's views regarding research objectives.

Operation and management of toll gates

The twenty-two fully functional rudimentary structures are operated on a twenty-four hour basis countrywide with four shifts rotating at an eight-hour interval throughout the twenty-four hours. One shift is always off-duty in order to provide for continuity. There are two collectors on each station, a supervisor and two armed police officers for each shift and toll Centre. The collectors issue tickets to account for all vehicles that pass through the toll booth. The cost or price per ticket depends on the type of vehicle (that is, \$2 (Zw\$163) for light motor vehicles, US\$4 for minibuses, US\$8 for buses, US\$10 for heavy vehicles and US\$15 for haulage trucks).

A vehicle is allowed to pass through after the payments have been made. However, cases in which some notorious motorists decelerate their vehicles upon reaching the booth only to accelerate their vehicles before paying were also experienced. Hence there is need for boom gates which will be opened after the payment is done as is the case with other countries such

as South Africa. Some motorists upon paying the fee do not wait for the ticket hence the likelihood of the same ticket being used by toll officers repeatedly thereby reducing revenue collection and prejudicing the state.

At the change of shift, records are written on a petty cash warrant (PCW). Reconciliations are then made to ascertain whether the tickets tally with amount collected. Tickets were then taken to the Head Office (Kurima House, in case of those in Harare) for reconciliations and aggregate record keeping with the Accountants who serve as general overseers/ or managers of the respective toll gates. That was during the time when toll collections were done but ZIMRA. These Accountants pay some timely visits to the toll sites to monitor the progress thereof. Some officials from ZINARA also pay some regular visits to the toll sites in a bid to monitor, manage and assess progress in terms of revenue collection at the toll Centres.

The above information shows the reactions that the motorists exhibit in relation to the system of toll gates. From the given statistics it is evident that the whole initiative was received with a hostile response by the toll payers.

Sixty-six-point seven percent of the respondents strongly feels that road networks were still in bad state and this implies that it is depriving the motorists of value for the toll fees as well as delays and in worst case scenarios diversion of drivers' attention at some point during the process of using the system. However, twenty-three percent of the respondents noted that the toll payers were indifferent to the toll gate system. Then seventy six percent were noted as being supportive to the system because they really felt and understood that it was a noble engagement. It was noted that there is need for a country to have sufficient revenues and this can be achieved by increasing through put of vehicles as well as enhanced efficiency via direct charging.

More than fifty five percent of the respondents strongly believe that in as much it is essential to realize more revenue from toll gates there is need for sensitivity to the motorists that is, to say the tolling system must user-friendly. The system must be publicly perceived as fair hence toll fees have to be paid basing on the direct benefit of the service to the road users.

Fifty one percent of the respondents were asked to rate the performance in comparison with other national revenue heads such as VAT, PAYE, Customs Duty, etc. Review of statistical data above suggests that toll gates received a fair performance rating as compared to other revenue heads. In financial terms the figures for 2010 shows that there was US\$49.6 million under tax revenues while in 2011 for every dollar realized in toll gates there was a corresponding US\$107.8 realized in aggregate taxes.

According to forty-nine-point 8 percent of respondents, variations in responses might be attributed to the fact that the respondents might have little knowledge on the real performance of the other revenue heads vis-à-vis toll gates since the aggregate information relating to revenue is handled and processed by other departments within ZIMRA. Since tolling collection is not the core business in ZIMRA, its officials were not in a position to make such detailed analyses in relation to other revenue heads.

Challenges faced by ZINARA

There are many challenges that are being faced by ZINARA and these include the following:

According to sixty four percent of respondents made up of motoring public and those from the Office of Auditor General, there has so much corruption in the awarding of tender without going through the correct legal, government procedures. Thus, the procurement of road construction vehicles and some of them not even suitable for Zimbabwean terrain. Furthermore, a lot of money has been lost thereby affecting road development and maintenance though the country.

According to these respondents, ZINARA operates in extremely opaque ways such that it has been failing to meet the minimum operation standards. The Annual reports from Office of the Auditor General has flagged a red flag over ZINARA operations. The accounting systems within ZINARA were weak thereby creating large loopholes for embezzlement and theft.

There is serious lack of transparency in the disbursements of funds such the general public have no idea as to how much money is raked in, in every six months or per annum and how this money is used or distributed to various local authorities for the purposes of road maintenance and or development. Thirty percent of those interviewed strongly believed that the political appointees in the ZINARA Board has colluded those senior management of ZINARA to steal the funds meant for roads to other things and for their own use.

The above view of senior Cabinet officials colluding with ZINARA official in corrupt practices has been strengthened by the fact that despite loss of so much moneys from ZINARA, nobody has been prosecuted. Others were actually removed from police cells in Avondale Harare by the former Vice President of the Republic Mr Phelekezela Mphoko. This and other instances are well document and in public domain.

There are so many challenges faced by the tollgates not on the Intertoll jurisdiction such as Plumtree-Bulawayo- Harare - Mutare. The other tollgates not on this route do lack proper infrastructure thereby resulting in high revenue leakages. These leakages are a result of corrupt ZINARA toll officials who take advantage of the weak internal systems and controls and weak auditing systems. According to sixty percent of the respondents, this is done in together with public motoring public who end up paying less and the moneys go into pockets of ZINARA officials and to some motoring public this is a win- win and the state is the loser in this case.

Fifty seven percent of respondents argued that in areas that are far from big cities experience huge problem of network challenges, at least efforts are being made to alleviate this problem. Some swipe machines are now Wi-Fi enable but not all banks have done that. Other banks have fallen by the wayside and have withdrawn their swipe machines and these banks include: Agribank, Steward Bank, NMB, have failed to stand against the hit of networks challenges in the country side.

Robberies have been experienced but these have been limited by virtue of the would be robbers knowing that there is so much of plastic money and some Zimbabwean dollars collected. Furthermore, the presence of police as well as armed members of Zimbabwe Republic Police Support Unit member at each tollgate is sufficient deterrent to would be robbers.

According to forty five percent of the respondents, another major challenge has been Covid19 lockdown restrictions imposed by Government of Zimbabwe in conjunction with other neighbouring countries and this has greatly reduced movements of private vehicles which form the majority or large percentage of travelling public as well as commuter omnibuses, buses.

The major highways being the biggest, were badly affected, because the revenue collected on the tollgates depends on the vehicles that pass through these tollgates. Seventy three percent of respondents from ZINARA maintained that tollgate fees collected went down by close to 55% of the total tollgate collection between April 2020 to July 2021. Most tollgates have been collecting far less than what is collected under normal circumstances. However, these ZINARA respondents went on to say that now the situation is slightly improving as motoring public is defying the lockdown regulation and there is now more travelling by the public

While ZIMRA announces and shows how much revenue has been collected from VAT, PAYE, customs duty etc and whether it is meeting its targets and by how much percent every six month twice per year, ZINARA does nothings to this effect thereby leaving the public to guess.

Importance of toll gate fees to the nation

The extent of revenue collection in any country is largely dependent on the capacity of the designated receivers of revenues. These should be capacitated institutionally, legally, technologically, financially and manpower wise. In all cities the toll system is operated by a public company which transfers the net revenue to the road authorities. This is consistent with scenarios in Zimbabwe where ZIMRA executes the collection and then transfers the net revenues to the Zimbabwe National Roads Agency (ZINARA).

The shift to tolling collections as ways of boosting domestic mobilization of resources, strengthening national ownership of development policies and outcomes and reducing state vulnerability to reductions in revenue arising from trade reforms. Domestic resource mobilization in the form of toll gates provide effective ways of financing long-run sustained growth and development. When governments derive a significant portion of their revenue from their taxation and non-revenue sources, they are most inclined to be more accountable and more efficient in the use their resources. Revenue Leakage

Tolling systems are prone revenue leakages. They need prudent management. According to sixty one percent of the respondents the majority of toll road operating in Zimbabwe, the traditional approach to ensuring that toll payments are made has been through the use of physical barriers. Each tollgate is manned by a toll collector who permits cars to proceed once full payment has been made. However, this approach does not prevent a variety of fraudulent acts from being committed. For instance, while the use of this system prevents anyone who does not have any means of payment from immediately passing through the toll lane, it does not prevent abuse of methods through the use of an acknowledgement of debt. He observed that memories of what happened to the Constituency Development Fund when some MPs did not claim their share of the money despite the fact that it was readily available and there was a crying need for the funds to be deployed at constituency level for development purposes, were still fresh.

Thirty percent of the respondents maintain that there is so much in terms of money that is being collected but it does appear that resources are not being put to good use. These respondents cite poor progress on the dualization of the dualisation of the Harare-Masvingo Road and patching up of potholes. "There is no illusion however about how much more needs to be done,"

Revenue from ZINARA can go a long way in developing and maintaining very good road throughout the country. There is need to develop and implement a transparent system that ensures the ZINARA funds are used for the intended purposes. In times past for example, Former minister of Transport, Nicholas Goche allocated Bindura, his home area, the lion's share, over \$2 million, of the \$14 707 961 disbursed for road development in this year's Mid-Term Fiscal Policy Review. Bindura – which is in the ZANU PF stronghold province of Mashonaland Central – got the largest chunk of \$2,6 million, followed by Zvimba which got \$2 070 809 and Mhondoro-Ngezi which got \$1 830 000.

When this matter came to parliament several Members of Parliament debated the issue. The consensus was that, “We should be sharing the national cake equally. In terms of policy requirements.”

Tollgates are very critical for collecting revenue because roads form the main artery of economic competitiveness, growth and social development. Since to construct roads cost billions of United States Dollars, toll roads will assist Zimbabwe in meeting the demands of social services, which are important for the growth of the country. It is the belief of most respondents in this study that toll roads accelerate the availability of initial funding for construction, compared to traditional tax-based funding. They also make new road capacity available to motorists sooner. Toll roads, therefore, reduce the total net cost to the economy, ensuring greater opportunities for prosperity and growth.

According to most respondents, when people pay taxes, the expectation is that these monies are used for the service which government renders to all citizens in all the provinces of the country. Therefore, tolls pay for only that portion of a road that we use in other words it is a user fee. Thus, toll fees are used directly on the road, which is a benefit to the motorists and other road users. Therefore, without tolls, more income tax would have been necessary to fund roads.

More than fifty percent of motorists interviewed agreed that people have to pay toll fees because roads have to be perpetually maintained which also reduce costs of servicing vehicles. The toll fees become important in that performance depends on how what and when maintenance is performed. Toll fund is important because roads deteriorate over time due to environmental influences such as weather, ultraviolet radiation, overloading etc. Tolls are not levied on the value of the current road, but only on the initial and future improvements, including operations and maintenance. Monies derived from taxes are used on other, non-toll-roads, including city streets.

ZINARA respondents said it does seem that the public do not fully understand that the tolls collected on a specific road are used to, among other things to repay the loans obtained to finance the building, upgrading or improvement of the road. In addition, it provided a dedicated on-going revenue stream, which enables the road to be adequately maintained and improved, independent of tax-based revenues.

Toll roads are built and maintained to the highest possible standards. Because we uphold such standards, South Africa is recognised as a world leader in pavement technology.

Therefore, people are ensured of a smooth ride, thereby saving the public on the running costs of their vehicle and also saving on time. Improved security ensures you a safe and

pleasant journey. Tolls ensure that funding is available much sooner, for adding highway capacity at the right time thereby relieving congestion, reducing losses in time and productivity.


Forces of policy reformation in Zimbabwe

The pie chart (Figure 4.3) shows the analysis of findings assessing the major forces of policy renewal from the questionnaire survey. 69.2 % of the respondents from regulatory bodies, stakeholders and Government Ministries officials revealed that in the country most reform of laws regulations and directives is motivated by the government. Respondents noted the current reformation of regulations to improve the ease of doing business which is initiated by the government through the Office of the President and Cabinet.

Further, sixty three percent of the respondents highlighted that almost all the policies that have been produced by the country in the past decade and associated instruments had been initiated by the government ministers. In addition, respondents gave the following instruments such as SI 64 of 2016, VAT on essential commodities, diamond mining directives which were initiated by the government. The respondents further argued that most of the regulatory instrument they develop is a result of instructions from the politicians. This is consistent with the most findings which indicated that many policies originated from political party's ZANU PF Politburo deliberations.

About fifteen-point four percent of the respondents mainly stakeholders indicated that citizens and key stakeholders have a less significant role in policy review in the country.

Figure 4.3 Forces of Policy Reform in Zimbabwe



Source: Research data

Also, 15.4 % (a significant number of government and regulatory bodies) said that international convention, standards is another force which has affected the need for the review of policy in

the country. The government will need to adhere to the signed transport conventions. In this regard regulations in gender equality, safety and health, environmental and economic trade were reviewed, suspended and new ones introduced. The table 4.3 shows a summary of responses on policy reform in the country.

From the Table 4.3, it is shown that 69.2 % mainly stakeholders and regulatory bodies reveals that most policy reformation is initiated by the government ministries. In this line, it is responsible ministers that introduce a directive to suspend a policy in the country. The participants' view is that the government's role to enact policies from the highest political levels and regard this as relevant to the political process of the country. Participants mainly stakeholders noted that they are not even consulted and at times are engaged when the instrument has already been introduced. The respondents reasoned that their role is not appreciated by politicians citing the announcement of increase of toll fees by the then Minister of Transport Obert Mpfu when the matter was in the courts.


4.9 Stakeholder engagement

In this section the question asked was how to address the public and those in particular affected by the transport regulations, thus according to views of major stakeholder to be identified. Findings from the interview process are shown in Figure 4.6, and those from the survey questionnaire are presented below

Eight-point two percent of respondents indicated that their organisations, have procedure regarding the participation of key stakeholders in their regulatory process. Stakeholders from Consumer Council of Zimbabwe, Confederation of Industries of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe United Passengers Association, Zimbabwe Truck Drivers Association have indicated they also have not been taken seriously by the relevant government ministry in terms of engagement. Only 8.2% of the respondents reported that their framework allows for a participation process where clients and stakeholders are involved in the development stages of the regulatory policy. But the situation on the ground indicates that government denied stakeholders' ideas and suggestions. Thus, lack of inclusiveness from government ministries show lack of the involvement of stakeholders cannot help to strengthen their democratic legitimacy of administrative measures and increases accountability for the proposed regulatory instruments.

Majority of respondents which is seventy three percent indicated that their organisation allows consultation to take place during developing regulations though it's not clear why ZINARA does not consider views of stakeholders leaving or giving itself sole authority to increase toll fees arbitrary how it is supposed to be done leaving it to interpretation on who is running the project at that time. They argued that the risk of data capture by a government as they choose whom to consult during the process leaving other stakeholders that will be affected by the introduced instrument. As a result, there has been endemic corruption at ZINARA largely as a result of lack of stakeholder involvement in most of its activities.

Figure 4.4 Stakeholder engagement Results



Source: Research data

In addition, 7.1% of the respondents indicated that though they are engaged during the process, their deliberations are not documented, and they don't have access to these. Most responders from the stakeholders like CCZ, Zimbabwe Truck drivers Association, Long Distance Buses Associations, observed an absence of the feedback system from different government ministries and that there is high level of arrogance in the country. Stakeholders indicated a lack of a feedback process in this regard. Lastly, twelve-point four percent of the respondents stated that most regulatory bodies only have a framework to engage with key stakeholders in who will be affected. In this regard, the risk of leaving other stakeholders like the public has been noted by industry organisations.

The study found out that sixty five percent of the respondents said their organisation have procedures where consultation is mandatory. However, findings from the stakeholders indicated that most organisations have it on paper, but the implementation is always lacking. The government ministries respondents highlighted challenges in resources for mass public hearings and difficulty in doing such programmes.

Furthermore, on participation framework, fifteen percent of the respondents have indicated that their organisations have an engagement structure and procedures on how to carry out the process. Most regulators disclosed that the course of including subject matter experts on the road regulatory system has proven difficult and brought some untrustworthy on some occasion.

More than half of the respondents particularly those stakeholders in transport sector argued that they have participated in public meetings for policy review, but they don't have access to the deliberations and feedback. Though most respondents from stakeholders revealed political intimidation and fear of expressing their actual thoughts on the proposed regulations. This mainly to the lack of trust between the citizens and government of Zimbabwe.

From the findings, 3.6 % of respondents mainly government ministries showed that they only engage the special group of stakeholders when they are developing policies. These respondents indicated budgetary constraints on resources to carry out the process, and they only invite key stakeholders for deliberations. However, as noted from the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe, government most of the time fails to identify the right stakeholder and leave important ones resulting in suspension or outcry when the policy is introduced. Sometimes it deliberately, ignores those who are knowledgeable and can give better input to take the country forward in terms of development and progress. This is the case with the matter of toll fee collection for road development and maintenance. This matter becomes too critical to leave in the hands of a few corrupt and not knowledgeable group of people.

However, respondents from government ministries, gave conflicting of interests from mainly major companies with enough capital to alter the process or swaying decisions particularly in safety, health and environmental issues where companies tend to spend money to meet compliance requirements.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This last part of the paper gives the conclusions derived from findings. The summary of findings does indicate that despite the collection of tolls from road users, there is limited impact on road development and its subsequent maintenance. Over 60% of respondents were sceptical about the uses of the financial resources collected by ZINARA. The respondents were of the view that there was no transparency nor accountability in the disbursement of ZINARA moneys.

The respondents from both Auditor General Office, ZIMRA and even from ZINARA itself admitted that ZINARA was collect large chunks of money both in foreign currency through the tolls levied on foreign trucks and passes as well as Zimbabwean vehicles crossing mainly into South Africa. It is argued that despite the availability of evidence of funds being collected, there is no evidence of the funds being put to good use and the roads since 2009 when toll fees were introduced. The most roads are in a deplorable state. More so in the area areas including Harare the capital city. The research established that Matabeleland North and South are the worst affected. For instance, the Bulawayo -Victoria Falls is in bad shape and this is also followed by Bulawayo-Beitbridge Road which is full of potholes and they have not been attended for a long period yet they are major, busy roads with heavy traffic.

The respondents of the study fully appreciated the need for levying motoring public for the purpose of developing the roads that are in dire need of attention. The disappointment comes when the funds are not being used for intended purposes.

The study established that ZINARA lacks accountability and transparency as is the case with other organisations like ZIMRA. For comparison's sake, ZIMRA publishes how much it has collected over a given period in terms of VAT, PAYE, customs duty and so forth. However, ZINARA does nothing of this nature. Therefore, there is no publicly known disbursement criteria of toll fees collected. The study found out that for instance, in 2015, ZINARA disbursed the funds in a politically motivated manner such that it did not benefit the nation as certain areas got what they did not deserve.

There have been very high levels of corruption as reported in both state and private media. These corruption scandals according to participants of the study include some senior and high-ranking government officials and the matter has been dying a natural death with no prosecution since the time of the late president up to date. ZINARA has also not followed procurement

board by going to tender in acquiring the equipment for use in road construction and maintenance and this irregular way of conducting business has prejudiced the state of millions of United States Dollars.

Conclusions

The study concludes that it is critical to collect toll fees for the development and maintenance of good network in Zimbabwe. This good network of roads will be beneficial to the whole country as it improves and eases movements of both goods and passengers from point A to point B. This is very critical for the study concludes that without good road network across the country, one cannot talk of development at all.

In addition, the findings do conclude that there is so much money in millions that has been raised by ZINARA since its inception. However, the disbursement of these funds have not been accounted for. There has been a lot of inconsistencies in the allocation of these funds. In the past 2012 to 2016, Mashonaland Central and parts of Mashonaland West were getting lion's share in the allocation of funds. Sadly, in Matabeleland North and South, Masvingo, Mashonaland East there is no evidence that meaningful disbursement has been made and there is no road network to talk about.

The study would like to conclude that there were many challenges that are facing ZINARA since its inception in 2009. Some of the challenges are structural, some internal and some external. In terms of structural challenges, the change from ZIMRA to ZINARA especially in the management of tollgates and collection of toll fees changed from mainly professional organisation with proven worth and professional ethics to an organisation that is opaque and not accountable. The study further notes high levels of corruption and the study concludes it does appear that corrupt ZINARA Officers are working together with corrupt senior government officials. This view is reinforced by the fact that no serious arrests or prosecution has not been done despite abundance of evidence

The study established that in terms of consultations on many other issues such as toll fees increase etc, ZINARA (government) does consult and always want to have its way out always. An example given is that of increase of toll fees during the tenure of Obert Mpofu as Minister of Transport that he did not consult the other stakeholders and went on to increase the fees despite the fact that the matter was in the courts of law.

Furthermore, respondents were of the view that ZINARA must embrace corporate governance systems and be transparent and accountable to the nation. In addition, employment of staff in that organisation must follow laid down procedures and the organisation must employ very competent and highly qualified officers because this country has the largest pool of professionals.

The study further concludes that there are so many leakages in the ZINARA system starting from collection points, to tenders, and outright stealing,

5.5 Recommendations

The researcher would like to make the following recommendations:

TO ZIMRA and ZINARA

The researcher recommends that all revenue collection should be done by one board such as ZIMRA to avoid duplicity or institutions and ensure that revenue is correctly as is the case with

ZIMRA. ZIMRA is well known for doing great work such that if it were not doing great work, Government would have been bankrupt way back. ZIMRA has systems in place and offices around the country such that it has capacity to do professional work. Therefore, it is being recommended that all revenue collection or toll fees collection should be taken back to ZIMRA. ZINARA must ensure that in all the areas where it has tollgates, there must have network so that motorists don't have to waste precious time, waiting for network. In view of this, it is therefore recommended that ZINARA must have WIFI systems to ensure connectivity and furthermore, all banks should be able to connect to ZINARA system to ensure members of the public who use different banking institutions are not disadvantaged.

To Government

There is serious need to improve stakeholder consultations with critical stakeholders such as motoring associations, Truck drivers' associations, Long Distance Buses associations etc on toll charges and other. It is necessary to have consensus with other stakeholders for easy implementation of decision. Involvement of stakeholders and stakeholder representatives at policy making stage as it improves the dual flow of information between the policy makers and the consumers and enables better understanding of regulatory matters by the consumer. Combining communicative and punitive methods of implementing legislation will help eliminate the notion that some of the consumers have those regulatory agencies are there for political influences, power and profit making and inspire the understanding that these implementing bodies are agents of the higher government mandated to help protect citizens from the undesired consequences of boards which are weak thereby promoting corruption.

The government should play critical roles in the appointment of board of directors is critical for the success of any modern organisation. The current and previous boards of directors have not been properly constituted. The use of political influence to bypass regulatory requirements encourages corruption.

Therefore, it is recommended that appointments of boards of directions should be done by relevant Parliamentary Portfolio Committee so that they can select people with proven track records and professionals in their own. The current system where the minister of the particular ministry appoints board members have had many weakness and had been breeding high levels of corruption and negligence and has resulted in loss of huge sums of money thereby depriving the state much needed revenue.

The success of organisations such as ZINARA and other companies, is dependent on the nature of board of directors and the systems of corporate governances and ethics that is in place. An organisation such as ZINARA cannot afford to operate in such opaque fashion or manner. The researchers recommends that ZINARA must have a properly constituted board of directors which is professional and knowledgeable which can take the organisation to greater heights. Furthermore, the organisation must implement corporate governance systems in the organisation to bring about transparency, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, equity and all things must be based on the rule of law.

Zimbabwe needs to adopt a system where administrative efficiency can reduce the cost of doing business with a balance of regulatory quality. From international practice in OECD countries which have used the RIA in policy formulation and implementation and produced tangible results and increase the ease of doing business. The study made the following recommendations;

To Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC): Developing of a regulatory framework policy for the country

For the action that addresses the need for evaluation and improves the quality of regulation produced in the country. The country needs to develop a regulatory policy framework that will help in dealing with issues of cost of doing business and improve the world ranking in ease of doing business. The OPC must ensure that appointment of management and Board of Directors are properly done to ensure that there is efficiency of ZINARA and that it does not bring the OPC and government into disrepute.

To the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and OPC: Revise the regulatory system and incorporate viable business model using experience.

This includes among others, the need to rationalise the costs that come with regulations, laws, statutory instruments and directives introduced by the government. This includes compliance costs both to industry and public, and the regulatory agencies and government. In the same line enforcement costs need to be factored in and the need to isolate departments and regulatory bodies on depending on the regulatory fees but seeing a big picture for the economy at large.

To Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary, State Enterprise Restructuring Agency (SERA) and Ministry of Industry and Commerce: Reducing multiple regulatory systems:

There is need to reduce the current tendency where different regulators regulate similar aspects of the business area. This duplication of roles or overlapping has been noted as increasing the compliance costs on business and consumers. Therefore, the regulatory system needs to establish a monitoring and evaluation system which is capable of measuring the relevance of the policy during its life cycle and continuous improvement if any. This will help in addressing the withdrawal of such instruments which no longer serve their intended purpose but are hindering the ease of doing business.

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